THE HISTORY
In 1989, a protest in the capital of Georgia, T'bilisi, was quelled by Russian troops and nine people were killed. According to Norton, it was the moment Georgians decided that they no longer wanted to be a part of the Soviet Union, and wanted to reclaim their identity as Georgians within their own republic. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia declared independence.
In 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin urged Georgia to grant definite political and legal status to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway regions in Georgia -- that status was never granted.
South Ossetia has run its own affairs since fighting for independence from Georgia in 1991-92, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has declared independence, though this has not been recognized by any other country. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, elected in 2004, vowed to bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under full Georgian control.
President Saakashvili offered South Ossetia dialogue and autonomy within a single Georgian state - but in 2006 South Ossetians voted in an unofficial referendum to press their demands for complete independence.
In April 2008 NATO said Georgia would be allowed to join the alliance at some point - angering Russia, which opposes the eastward expansion of NATO. Weeks later, Russia stepped up ties with the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In July Russia admitted its fighter jets entered Georgian airspace over South Ossetia to "cool hot heads in Tbilisi". Occasional clashes escalated, until six people were reportedly killed by Georgian shelling. Attempts to reach a cease-fire stalled.
After further exchanges of fire, Georgia launched an air and ground attacks on South Ossetia on August 7th, only hours after the sides agreed a cease-fire. The next day, Georgian forces were reportedly in control of Tskhinvali.
Russia responded by pouring thousands of troops into South Ossetia, and launching bombing raids both over the province and on targets in the rest of Georgia. Within days, Russia had seized control of Tskhinvali.
In 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin urged Georgia to grant definite political and legal status to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway regions in Georgia -- that status was never granted.
South Ossetia has run its own affairs since fighting for independence from Georgia in 1991-92, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has declared independence, though this has not been recognized by any other country. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, elected in 2004, vowed to bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under full Georgian control.
President Saakashvili offered South Ossetia dialogue and autonomy within a single Georgian state - but in 2006 South Ossetians voted in an unofficial referendum to press their demands for complete independence.
In April 2008 NATO said Georgia would be allowed to join the alliance at some point - angering Russia, which opposes the eastward expansion of NATO. Weeks later, Russia stepped up ties with the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In July Russia admitted its fighter jets entered Georgian airspace over South Ossetia to "cool hot heads in Tbilisi". Occasional clashes escalated, until six people were reportedly killed by Georgian shelling. Attempts to reach a cease-fire stalled.
After further exchanges of fire, Georgia launched an air and ground attacks on South Ossetia on August 7th, only hours after the sides agreed a cease-fire. The next day, Georgian forces were reportedly in control of Tskhinvali.
Russia responded by pouring thousands of troops into South Ossetia, and launching bombing raids both over the province and on targets in the rest of Georgia. Within days, Russia had seized control of Tskhinvali.
ANALYSIS:
Russia is trying to re-establish itself as a superpower, starting in its own backyard. If that's true, it would seem it’s going to do so by driving a wedge between it and the rest of the world.
But why would the Kremlin risk that kind of isolation, not to mention international ire, over two tiny enclaves that have been fighting the ethnic Georgians for decades?
A fight for the oil pipelines is one answer.
By absorbing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia puts even more pressure on Georgia's BTC pipeline, one of the few that transits oil through the Caucasus that is not under Russian control.
But why would the Kremlin risk that kind of isolation, not to mention international ire, over two tiny enclaves that have been fighting the ethnic Georgians for decades?
A fight for the oil pipelines is one answer.
By absorbing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia puts even more pressure on Georgia's BTC pipeline, one of the few that transits oil through the Caucasus that is not under Russian control.
But is this really all about oil? Would Russia and Georgia - and by extension, the United States - go to the very brink and back over energy? As Russian forces begin pulling out of Georgia and reporters regain some distance from the front lines, another answer comes to mind. The one thing that triggers Kremlin fears more than anything else: democracy.
Democracy’s basic ingredients, the freedom to assemble, to speak, to choose - these are like kryptonite in the hands of the Kremlin’s authoritarian mega-capitalists.
How often have we heard it from Russia's crushed opposition voices? Medvedev and Putin don't want a war with the West, because their clothes and expensive watches are Western, their vacations are taken there, their yachts are made there, and their children and the children of their cronies want to be educated there. No, their war is with an idea - democracy.
Look at the new geopolitical map that's redrawing itself in the wake of the Georgia conflict - with the United States, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltics and Israel on one side. On the other is Russia, Belarus, Syria and Iran.
More than a war of power, or energy, this lays out the Kremlin's battle zone against democratic forces that - if unleashed in Russia - could destroy it. In fact, Georgia marks the new Cold War frontline between Russian autocratic rule, and democracy's Ground Zero.
Russia doesn't really fear or hate NATO. It knows very well that NATO is not the threat. The threat to Putin-ocracy - and the real threat from Georgia - is the close proximity of Western freedoms to Russia's very borders.
Russia, remember, had freedom in the 1990s, and almost drowned from too much of it. Putin and his hand-picked successor, Medevedev, won't allow that to happen again, even if it means going to war.
Democracy’s basic ingredients, the freedom to assemble, to speak, to choose - these are like kryptonite in the hands of the Kremlin’s authoritarian mega-capitalists.
How often have we heard it from Russia's crushed opposition voices? Medvedev and Putin don't want a war with the West, because their clothes and expensive watches are Western, their vacations are taken there, their yachts are made there, and their children and the children of their cronies want to be educated there. No, their war is with an idea - democracy.
Look at the new geopolitical map that's redrawing itself in the wake of the Georgia conflict - with the United States, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltics and Israel on one side. On the other is Russia, Belarus, Syria and Iran.
More than a war of power, or energy, this lays out the Kremlin's battle zone against democratic forces that - if unleashed in Russia - could destroy it. In fact, Georgia marks the new Cold War frontline between Russian autocratic rule, and democracy's Ground Zero.
Russia doesn't really fear or hate NATO. It knows very well that NATO is not the threat. The threat to Putin-ocracy - and the real threat from Georgia - is the close proximity of Western freedoms to Russia's very borders.
Russia, remember, had freedom in the 1990s, and almost drowned from too much of it. Putin and his hand-picked successor, Medevedev, won't allow that to happen again, even if it means going to war.
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