GRP - BANGSAMORO PACT

THE HISTORY:

The draft pact on Bangsamoro homeland supposed to be entered into between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to bring peace in Mindanao.

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES:
It is a birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous people of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as “Bangsamoros”. Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood.
Ownership of the homeland is vested exclusively in them by virtue of their prior rights of occupation that had inhered in them as sizeable bodies of people, delimited by their ancestors since time immemorial, and being the first politically organized dominant occupants.
Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves or through the ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except when prevented by war, civil disturbance, force majeure, or other forms of possible usurpation or displacement.
The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) shall have the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands, including both alienable and non-alienable lands encompassed within the homeland and ancestral history.
The Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.
The Bangsamoro juridical entity is empowered with the authority and responsibility for the land use, development, conservation and disposition of the natural resources within the homeland.
The Bangsamoro juridical entity is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
The Bangsamoro government take or profit split from total production shall be shared with the Central Government on a percentage ratio of 75%/25% in favor of the Bangsamoro juridical entity.
The ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as a distinct dominant people.




MY OPINION:

Will the MOA on ancestral domain really bring peace in Mindanao? I don’t think so.

This agreement will only give MILF reason to declare independence and recognize Bangsamoro juridical entity as a state. In any event, the state should possess the following elements in order to be regarded as an international person:
(a) permanent population --- all Moros and all Indigenous people of Mindanao ;
(b) defined territory --- Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region;
(c) government --- establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them ;
(d) sovereignty --- Bangsamoro juridical entity is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries.
(e) recognition

As stated in the Article 1 of 1987 Constitution, the national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. The proposed MOA AD violates the Constitution since parts Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region will comprise Bangsamoro homeland.

Also under the MOA, the ARMM, composed of Sulu, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City will be expanded to include more than 700 villages in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato. The essence of the agreement is not the expansion of the Moro homeland but its concept, the recognition of the Moro people and state.

The MOA also grants the BJE an extraordinary power that is to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries. This power is not delegated and deemed retained by the national government under our Constitution. Thus, such power is inconsistent with the Constitution.
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RUSSIA - GEORGIA CONFLICT

THE HISTORY

In 1989, a protest in the capital of Georgia, T'bilisi, was quelled by Russian troops and nine people were killed. According to Norton, it was the moment Georgians decided that they no longer wanted to be a part of the Soviet Union, and wanted to reclaim their identity as Georgians within their own republic. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia declared independence.
In 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin urged Georgia to grant definite political and legal status to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway regions in Georgia -- that status was never granted.
South Ossetia has run its own affairs since fighting for independence from Georgia in 1991-92, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has declared independence, though this has not been recognized by any other country. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, elected in 2004, vowed to bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under full Georgian control.
President Saakashvili offered South Ossetia dialogue and autonomy within a single Georgian state - but in 2006 South Ossetians voted in an unofficial referendum to press their demands for complete independence.
In April 2008 NATO said Georgia would be allowed to join the alliance at some point - angering Russia, which opposes the eastward expansion of NATO. Weeks later, Russia stepped up ties with the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In July Russia admitted its fighter jets entered Georgian airspace over South Ossetia to "cool hot heads in Tbilisi". Occasional clashes escalated, until six people were reportedly killed by Georgian shelling. Attempts to reach a cease-fire stalled.
After further exchanges of fire, Georgia launched an air and ground attacks on South Ossetia on August 7th, only hours after the sides agreed a cease-fire. The next day, Georgian forces were reportedly in control of Tskhinvali.
Russia responded by pouring thousands of troops into South Ossetia, and launching bombing raids both over the province and on targets in the rest of Georgia. Within days, Russia had seized control of Tskhinvali.

ANALYSIS:

Russia is trying to re-establish itself as a superpower, starting in its own backyard. If that's true, it would seem it’s going to do so by driving a wedge between it and the rest of the world.
But why would the Kremlin risk that kind of isolation, not to mention international ire, over two tiny enclaves that have been fighting the ethnic Georgians for decades?
A fight for the oil pipelines is one answer.
By absorbing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia puts even more pressure on Georgia's BTC pipeline, one of the few that transits oil through the Caucasus that is not under Russian control.

But is this really all about oil? Would Russia and Georgia - and by extension, the United States - go to the very brink and back over energy? As Russian forces begin pulling out of Georgia and reporters regain some distance from the front lines, another answer comes to mind. The one thing that triggers Kremlin fears more than anything else: democracy.
Democracy’s basic ingredients, the freedom to assemble, to speak, to choose - these are like kryptonite in the hands of the Kremlin’s authoritarian mega-capitalists.
How often have we heard it from Russia's crushed opposition voices? Medvedev and Putin don't want a war with the West, because their clothes and expensive watches are Western, their vacations are taken there, their yachts are made there, and their children and the children of their cronies want to be educated there. No, their war is with an idea - democracy.
Look at the new geopolitical map that's redrawing itself in the wake of the Georgia conflict - with the United States, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltics and Israel on one side. On the other is Russia, Belarus, Syria and Iran.
More than a war of power, or energy, this lays out the Kremlin's battle zone against democratic forces that - if unleashed in Russia - could destroy it. In fact, Georgia marks the new Cold War frontline between Russian autocratic rule, and democracy's Ground Zero.
Russia doesn't really fear or hate NATO. It knows very well that NATO is not the threat. The threat to Putin-ocracy - and the real threat from Georgia - is the close proximity of Western freedoms to Russia's very borders.
Russia, remember, had freedom in the 1990s, and almost drowned from too much of it. Putin and his hand-picked successor, Medevedev, won't allow that to happen again, even if it means going to war.

SEN. PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR#158088 JULY 6, 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.”[1] Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute.[2] The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations.[3] Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.[4]

ISSUE:

Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President?

RULING:

We rule in the negative.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations.[12] As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.[13] In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.

Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.[14] By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.[15]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

SALIENT FEATURES:

1. The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, so called because it was adopted in Rome, Italy on 17 July 1998 by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute is an international treaty, binding only on those States which formally express their consent to be bound by its provisions. These States then become “Parties” to the Statute. In accordance with its terms, the Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, once 60 States had become Parties.

2. As of July 2008, 106 states are members of the Court;[6] Suriname and Cook Islands will become states parties on 1 October 2008, bringing the total to 108.[7] A further 40 countries have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute.[8] However, a number of states, including China, India and the United States, are critical of the Court and have not joined.[citation needed]

3. As of 1st June 2008, 106 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Out of them 30 are African States, 13 are Asian States, 16 are from Eastern Europe, 22 are from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 25 are from Western Europe and other States.

4. The official seat of the Court is in The Hague, Netherlands, but its proceedings may take place anywhere.[16] The ICC is sometimes referred to as a "world court"; it should not be confused with the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, which is the United Nations organisation that settles disputes between nations.[17]

5. The Court is composed of four organs. These are the Presidency, the judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.
Presidency
Judicial Divisions
Office of the Prosecutor
Registry

6. The Court can generally exercise jurisdiction only in cases where the accused is a national of a state party, the alleged crime took place on the territory of a state party, or a situation is referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council.[9] The Court is designed to complement existing national judicial systems: it can exercise its jurisdiction only when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute such crimes.[10][11] Primary responsibility to investigate and punish crimes is therefore left to individual states.[12]

7. To date, the Court has opened investigations into four situations: Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Darfur.[13] The Court has issued public arrest warrants for twelve people; six of them remain free, two have died, and four are in custody. The Court's first trial, of Congolese militia leader Thomas Lubanga, was due to begin on 23 June 2008 but it was halted on 13 June when judges ruled that the Prosecutor's refusal to disclose potentially exculpatory material had breached Lubanga's right to a fair trial.[14][15]

8. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
Article 5 of the Rome Statute grants the Court jurisdiction over four groups of crimes, which it refers to as the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The statute defines each of these crimes except for aggression: it provides that the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until such time as the states parties agree on a definition of the crime and set out the conditions under which it may be prosecuted.[2][3]

9. During the negotiations that led to the Rome Statute, a large number of states argued that the Court should be allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction. However, this proposal was defeated due in large part to opposition from the United States.[37] A compromise was reached, allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction only under the following limited circumstances:
--where the person accused of committing a crime is a national of a state party (or where the person's state has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court);
--where the alleged crime was committed on the territory of a state party (or where the state on whose territory the crime was committed has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court); or
--where a situation is referred to the Court by the UN Security Council.[9]

10. The Court's jurisdiction does not apply retroactively: it can only prosecute crimes committed on or after 1 July 2002 (the date on which the Rome Statute entered into force). Where a state becomes party to the Rome Statute after that date, the Court can exercise jurisdiction automatically with respect to crimes committed after the statute enters into force for that state.[5]

11. Even where the Court has jurisdiction, it will not necessarily act. The principle of “complementarity” provides that certain cases will be inadmissible even though the Court has jurisdiction. In general, a case will be inadmissible if it has been or is being investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction. However, a case may be admissible if the investigating or prosecuting State is unwilling or unable to genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. For example, a case would be admissible if national proceedings were undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility. In addition, a case will be inadmissible if it is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.

12. Assembly of States Parties
The Court's management oversight and legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties, consists of one representative from each state party.[40] Each state party has one vote and every effort has to be made to reach decisions by consensus.[40] If consensus cannot be reached, decisions are made by vote.[40]

13. The Assembly meets in full session once a year in New York or The Hague, and may also hold special sessions where circumstances require.[40] Sessions are open to observer states and non-governmental organisations.[41]

14. The Assembly elects the judges and prosecutors, decides the Court's budget, adopts important texts (such as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), and provides management oversight to the other organs of the Court.[40][38] Article 46 of the Rome Statute allows the Assembly to remove from office a judge or prosecutor who "is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties" or "is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute".[42]

15. The states parties cannot interfere with the judicial functions of the Court.[43] Disputes concerning individual cases are settled by the Judicial Divisions.

16. The Rome Statute provides that all persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt,[54] and establishes certain rights of the accused and persons during investigations.[55] These include the right to be fully informed of the charges against him or her; the right to have a lawyer appointed, free of charge; the right to a speedy trial; and the right to examine the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf.

17. In order to ensure “equality of arms” between defence and prosecution teams, the ICC has established an independent Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) to provide logistical support, advice and information to defendants and their counsel.[58][59] The OPCD also helps to safeguard the rights of the accused during the initial stages of an investigation.[60] However, Thomas Lubanga's defence team say they have been given a smaller budget than the Prosecutor and that evidence and witness statements have been slow to arrive.[61]

18. The Rome Statute provides for victim participation in the Court's proceedings.[62][63] Article 43(6) establishes a Victims and Witnesses Unit to provide "protective measures and security arrangements, counseling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses."[64] Article 68 sets out procedures for the "Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings."[65] The Court has also established an Office of Public Counsel for Victims, to provide support and assistance to victims and their legal representatives.[66] Article 78 of the Rome Statute establishes a Trust Fund to make financial reparations to victims and their families.[67]

19. Situations before the court
The Court has received complaints about alleged crimes in at least 139 countries[92] but, as of July 2008, the Prosecutor has opened investigations into just four situations: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Darfur.[13]

20. FINANCE
The Court is financed by contributions from the states parties. The amount payable by each state party is determined using the same method as the United Nations:[80] each state's contribution is based on the country’s capacity to pay, which reflects factors such as a national income and population. The maximum amount a single country can pay in any year is limited to 22% of the Court's budget; Japan paid this amount in 2008.